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INTRODUCTION
The California High Speed Rail Authority (“HSRA”) bases its
preemption arguments on a misunderstanding. Congress did not give the
Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) “exclusive and plenary jurisdiction
over railroad operations.” The Interstate Commerce Commission
Termination Act (“ICCTA”), 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11908, does not provide
a pervasive scheme of national railroad regulation or planning that bars
state exercise of police powers to protect the health and the environment.
To the contrary, Congress entered the railroad regulatory arena in 1887 for
the limited purpose of bringing economic stability to an emergent industry,
and every statutory revision over the following century was directed at the
same objective – facilitating a competitive market. In continually adjusting
the law to meet the economic concerns of the time, Congress has
consistently preserved traditional state powers to protect public health,
safety, and the environment, even when those powers incidentally affect
railroad operations.
The STB has no jurisdiction over the North Coast Railroad
Authority (“NCRA”) project at issue here – the potential rehabilitation and
reopening of a rail line shut down for safety reasons by another federal
agency. NCRA did not apply for or receive STB approval to restore service
and recommence operation on its existing line. The single action that the
STB took (and had authority to take) was certifying Defendant Northwest
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Pacific Railroad Company (“NWPCo”) as qualified to become the line
operator should NCRA’s putative lease with NWPCo be consummated and
the rail line reopened. The STB did not approve day-to-day “operations”
on the line, as HSRA implies, when it granted NWPCo’s operator status
license application. Nor does the STB have statutory authority to pass
judgment on the wisdom of California’s investment decision to repair and
reopen the line. The STB merely granted new operator status if and when
the line returned to service.
The express language in the ICCTA does not preempt how a railroad
decides whether to rehabilitate a line and bring it back into service, such as
through the environmental review process NCRA used here. Instead, the
ICCTA preempts only those other state and federal remedies “with respect
to the regulation of rail transportation.” The California Environmental
Quality Act (“CEQA”) does not target railroad economics, or even
railroads, for regulation and thus does not intrude into that area in which the
ICCTA forbids states to regulate. As is undisputed, CEQA is a law of
general application, intended to inform California public agency
decisionmaking. It requires disclosure of potential adverse environmental
impacts from public agency project approvals and mitigation of those
impacts where feasible. Similarly, state law remedies for NCRA’s failure
to comply with CEQA in connection with its repair and reopening project
do not conflict with any STB-approved activities or ICCTA remedies.
2

CEQA is California’s tool to hold politically accountable subsidiary
public agencies and the officials who fund and administer agency assets
and decisions. Under the Nixon-Gregory doctrine, absent a clear statement
from Congress, federal law may not “trench on” how a state chooses to
constitute itself as a sovereign political entity. HSRA’s attempt to avoid
the Nixon clear-statement rule by arguing that Congress intended that
public railroads be treated the same as private railroads is unavailing.
Without an unambiguous and explicit statement that Congress intended the
ICCTA to preempt how states govern the decisionmaking process of public
rail authorities, courts may not interpret the ICCTA to preempt how
California determines the legitimacy and legal enforceability of decisions
made by a subsidiary agency to conduct state-owned business.
Moreover, as market participants, both public and private entities are
free to consider the environmental effects of capital investments they make.
HSRA cannot cite any ICCTA provision that preempts such internal
decisionmaking. Instead, to avoid the determination that NCRA was acting
on behalf of the State, as a market participant, HSRA falls back on its
fundamental misconception that Congress intended plenary regulation of
the rail industry, notwithstanding the ICCTA’s clear intent to largely
deregulate the rail industry and allow the market to operate freely. HSRA
is thus incorrect when it argues that California cannot act as a market
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participant, or proprietor, when deciding how to lease and invest millions of
dollars in rehabilitating a decrepit rail line.
Finally, HSRA argues that even if there are voluntary agreements
not subject to ICCTA preemption, where those agreements impose an
unreasonable burden on railroad operations, their terms are preempted. But
HSRA fails to apply the rule to the facts here, where agreements provided
state funding necessary to repair and reopen the rail line and to secure
authorization from the co-owner of the line for NWPCo to act as the future
operator. These agreements further demonstrate that CEQA is not
preempted here.
ARGUMENT
I.

The ICCTA Does Not Preempt California’s Requirement that
Adequate CEQA Review Precede NCRA’s Line Repair Project.
A.

HSRA’s Preemption Argument Rests on the Faulty
Assumption of STB Jurisdiction over NCRA’s Project.

HSRA’s brief hinges almost entirely on an erroneous premise – that
the CEQA “project” at issue here “is subject to STB jurisdiction and
regulation under the ICCTA.” California High-Speed Rail Authority
Amicus Brief in Support of Respondents at 5 (“HSRA:5”).1 According to

1

See also, e.g., HSRA:10 (contending that “the public rail agency is
subject to STB jurisdiction and is operating a railroad in interstate
commerce pursuant to a license from the STB”); 38 (claiming this case
involves “section 10501(b) and actions subject to the STB’s exclusive
jurisdiction and regulation”); 40 (claiming NCRA is “engaged in interstate
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HSRA, the STB’s approval of NWPCo as a potential operator established
STB jurisdiction and therefore the ICCTA’s preemptive reach over
NCRA’s repair and reopening project. This premise is wrong.
The CEQA “project” for which the challenged EIR was prepared is
NCRA’s decision to repair and reopen the line. The EIR here was intended
to inform NCRA’s decision whether to move forward with rehabilitating a
dilapidated railroad that another agency, the Federal Railroad
Administration, shuttered years ago for safety reasons. See AR:9:4592
(Dec. 9, 1998).2 The STB did not assert any jurisdiction over NCRA’s
process for deciding whether and how to reestablish service along the
Russian River Division of the railroad. It merely certified lessee NWPCo
as a potential future operator of the line “upon consummation of the
transaction.” AR:16:8117, 8207. That “transaction” included CEQA
compliance and consent by the Sonoma-Marin Area Rail Transit District,
co-owner of the rail line. AR:13:6731.
As discussed further below, the STB does not have authority over
rehabilitation work on an existing line or any say in the process a private or

commerce by railroad and under the STB’ s exclusive jurisdiction, and
facing CEQA lawsuits”); 49 (implying NCRA is a “public rail agencies
constructing or operating rail lines under STB jurisdiction”).
2

Citations to the Administrative Record and to Plaintiffs’ Consolidated
Appendix appear, respectively, as “AR:[volume]:[page]” and
“App:[volume]:[tab]:[page].”

5

public railroad uses to decide whether to proceed with that work. Nor does
the STB’s approval of a change in operator status preempt California’s
ability to make an informed decision about state-funded, discretionary
infrastructure projects merely because CEQA compliance may affect how
repairs are conducted, may result in judicial review, or may convince the
state not to go forward with the project at all.
Were HSRA’s legal theory correct, the STB could dramatically
expand its legislatively-limited jurisdiction and effectively commandeer
taxpayer revenue to compel state action, even if California ultimately
decided to forego the project for financial, environmental, or other reasons.
As explained below, Congress did not grant such plenary authority to the
STB, which is not surprising since HSRA’s position here is inconsistent
with the most basic tenets of federalism. E.g., Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997).
B.

The History of the ICCTA Reflects Evolving
Congressional Concern About the Financial Viability of
the Industry, Not an Intent to Preempt Traditional State
Decisionmaking Authority.

HSRA’s preemption analysis relies selectively on a statutory
predecessor to the ICCTA – the Transportation Act of 1920 – but ignores
the context in which Congress was legislating. The Transportation Act was
designed to bolster the economic sustainability of the interstate rail
transportation system as a whole. It did so by giving the federal
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government more rate-setting authority and shielding interstate carriers
from financially onerous state mandates to invest in capital-intensive new
lines or operations for the benefit of local commerce. The Transportation
Act was thus consistent with earlier and later versions of the law, all of
which reflect Congress’ focus on responding to the unstable economics of
the rail industry – rapid expansion followed by contraction.3
In nearly 130 years of railroad legislating, Congress has never
expressed an intent either to displace the states’ ability to control their own
public expenditures and decisionmaking processes or to preempt the
exercise of traditional state police power protecting public health, safety,
and the environment. Nor has Congress extended federal jurisdiction over
repair work on existing lines. The ICCTA, in short, is not the all-pervasive
federal regulatory regime that HSRA suggests. See Plaintiffs’ Opening
Brief at 17-22 (“OB:17-21”); Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief at 3-4 (“RB:3-4”).

3

Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Interstate Commerce
Commission: The Tortuous Path from Regulation to Deregulation of
America’s Infrastructure, 95 Marq. L. Rev. 1151, 1152 (2012) (“Dempsey
I”) (“Congress [in 1887] instituted regulation under the ICC largely to
protect the public from the monopolistic abuses of the railroads. Between
1920 and 1975, however, the goal of the national transportation policy
shifted to protection of the transportation industry from . . . unconstrained
competition.”).
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1.

The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887

American railroads were originally chartered under state law and
regulated pursuant to historic state police powers.4 But early state efforts to
curb monopolistic behavior and corruption in the rapidly-expanding rail
industry proved largely ineffective.5 After the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down Illinois’ ability to regulate freight rates on interstate routes, St. Louis
& Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886) (finding regulation
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause), the federal government
stepped into the economic regulation of railroads for the first time with
adoption of the Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”) in 1887. The ICA
outlawed rebates and pooling, forced railroads to publish rates, and
ultimately required the new Interstate Commerce Commission
(“Commission”) to ensure that rail fees were “just and reasonable.” Smith
at 339-40; Dempsey II at 265; Hovenkamp at 1035.

4

Zachary Smith, Tailor-Made: State Regulation at the Periphery of
Federal Law, 36 Transp. L.J. 335, 338 (2009) (citing James Ely, Jr.
Railroads and American Law (2001)); Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory
Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad Problem, 97 Yale
L.J. 1017, 1034 n.90 (1988) (noting that the rail system was developed
“largely by means of state initiative and almost exclusively under state
control” and that “before 1887 federal regulation was virtually
nonexistent”).
5

See James W. Ely, Jr., “The Railroad System Has Burst Through State
Limits”: Railroads and Interstate Commerce, 1830-1920, 55 Ark. L. Rev.
933 (2003) (“Ely”); Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal
History, 30 Transp. L.J. 235, 254-65 (2003) (“Dempsey II”).)
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In response to early, narrow judicial interpretations of the ICA,
Congress conveyed increasing authority on the Commission over the next
three decades to regulate interstate rail rates. Hovenkamp at 1035-44; Ely
at 966-67; Dempsey I at 1163-64. The economic challenge facing
regulators at the time was that “[m]onopoly railroads earned monopoly
profits, while competing railroads were driven into bankruptcy.”
Hovenkamp at 1035-44 (explaining that “railroad interests seemed destined
to be either filthy rich or perpetually broke”). Fierce competition in longhaul interstate markets drove rates down to the point where carriers often
could not cover fixed costs, while state regulators tried to prevent
monopoly rents on more profitable short-haul intrastate routes, where lack
of competition allowed a greater return. Id. at 1049-55. The Supreme
Court eventually recognized that this short-haul/long-haul problem
threatened the long-term economic health of the rail industry, and allowed
the federal government increasing leeway to address intrastate rates in
connection with the Commission’s supervision of interstate routes. Ely at
969-73.
2.

The Transportation Act of 1920

These concerns moved Congress to enact the Transportation Act of
1920. Dempsey II at 272 (“After World War I, [federal] policy . . . shifted
from one of protecting the public from the market abuses of the
transportation industry to one of preserving a healthy economic
9

environment for common carriers.”). Congress was concerned with
“freeriding by the states,” with state-imposed low rates for intrastate rail
traffic threatening the overall financial viability of the industry. Ely at 976
(citing R.R. Comm’n of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U.S.
563, 588 (1922)). To address this concern, the Transportation Act
augmented the Commission’s powers, conveying new authority to
supervise the rail industry’s issuance of securities and to regulate intrastate
rates when they affected interstate commerce. Ely at 974; Dayton-Goose
Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456, 478 (1924).
Relevant here, the Transportation Act also provided “that no
interstate carrier shall undertake the extension of its line of railroad or the
construction of a new line of railroad, or shall acquire or operate any line of
railroad, or extension thereof, or shall engage in transportation over such
additional or extended line of railroad unless and until the Commission
shall certify that public convenience present or future requires it, and that
no carrier shall abandon all or any portion of its line or the operation of it
without a similar certificate of approval.” R.R. Comm’n of Cal. v. S. Pac.
Co. 264 U.S. 331, 344 (1924) (discussing paragraphs 18 to 21 of section
402). This new statutory language did not provide plenary federal
jurisdiction over rail operations, but instead targeted specific activities, and
there is no evidence that Congress intended the Commission to engage in
affirmative planning for a national rail system, or to oversee repairs of
10

existing rail lines. Rather, the narrow purpose of this new provision was
“to prevent interstate carriers from incurring expense which will lessen
their ability to perform well their interstate functions.” Id. at 347.
By requiring federal authorization for new construction, expansion,
and operation of rail lines, Congress intended both to prevent overbuilding
of expensive infrastructure believed to threaten the industry’s financial
vitality and to bar “states from requiring carriers to provide service at a
loss, a step which contradicted the national policy of building a strong rail
system.” Ely at 974-75. Despite extending federal authority over new and
expanded lines, the Transportation Act did not give the Commission direct
authority over intrastate rail rates and explicitly exempted “the construction
or abandonment of spur, industrial, team, switching or side tracks, located
or to be located wholly within one state” from the new federal certification
requirement. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 264 U.S. at 345 (quoting paragraph 22
of section 402).
3.

The Staggers Act of 1980

It was not until the Staggers Act of 1980 that Congress directly
addressed state jurisdiction over intrastate routes, even as it simultaneously
“began the substantial economic deregulation of the surface transportation
industry and the whittling away of the size and scope of the
[Commission].” H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 82 (1995). In response to new
concerns about the industry’s economic viability, the Staggers Act
11

“deregulated most railroad rates, legalized railroad shipping contracts,
simplified abandonments, and stimulated an explosion of service and
marketing alternatives.” Id. at 91.
Even with this considerable statutory overhaul, states retained a role
in economic regulation, albeit one constrained by federal oversight. The
Staggers Act provided that “[a] State authority may only exercise
jurisdiction over intrastate transportation provided by a rail carrier . . . if
such State authority exercises such jurisdiction exclusively in accordance
with the provisions of this subtitle.” Pub. L. 96-448, § 214(b), 94 Stat.
1895 (1980) (formerly 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)(1)). The statute required each
state “exercising jurisdiction over intrastate rates, classifications, rules, and
practices for intrastate transportation” to submit its “intrastate regulatory
rate standards and procedures” to the Commission for review and
certification. Id. (formerly 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)(2)).
To effectuate these changes, the Staggers Act for the first time
expressly preempted state economic regulation of railroads (rates,
schedules, classifications, etc.) unless the Commission certified the state
rules. This new preemption language, codified in section 10501(d),
provided: “The jurisdiction of the Commission and of State authorities (to
the extent such authorities are authorized to administer the standards and
procedures of this title pursuant to this section and section 11501(b) of this
title) over transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided in this
12

title with respect to the rates, classifications, rules, and practices of such
carriers, is exclusive.” Id. (formerly 49 U.S.C. § 10501(d)). The
Conference Report explained that this provision preempted only state
financial regulation of the industry:
The Conferees’ intent is to ensure that the price and service
flexibility and revenue adequacy goals of the Act are not
undermined by state regulation of rates, practices, etc., which are not
in accordance with these goals. Accordingly, the Act preempts state
authority over rail rates, classifications, rules, and practices. States
may only regulate in these areas if they are certified under the
procedures of this section.
The remedies available against rail carriers with respect to rail rates,
classifications, rules and practices are exclusively those provided by
the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, and any other federal
statutes which are not inconsistent with the Interstate Commerce
Act. No state law or federal or state common law remedies are
available.
H.R. Rep. No. 96-1430, at 106 (1980) (Conf. Rep.). The Staggers Act thus
made clear that state legislatures and state courts could not regulate railroad
economics, even on intrastate lines, without federal concurrence.
While the Staggers Act altered the federal-state balance with regard
to economic regulation of railroad rates, it did not substantively change the
provisions of the earlier Transportation Act governing federal supervision
over new construction, extension, and abandonment of lines. Sections
10901 through 10906 of the Staggers Act merely recodified the requirement
(from section 402, paragraphs 18-21) of the Transportation Act that federal
approval was necessary for construction, extension, acquisition, operation,
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and abandonment of interstate lines under the Commission’s jurisdiction.
(formerly 49 U.S.C. §§ 10901-06). And section 10907 reiterated (from
section 402, paragraph 22 of the Transportation Act) that “[t]he
Commission does not have authority under sections 10901–10906 of this
title over . . . the construction, requisition, operation, abandonment or
discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching or side tracks if the
tracks are located, or intended to be located, entirely in one state.” Id.
(formerly 49 U.S.C. § 10907).
4.

The ICCTA of 1995

With enactment of the ICCTA in 1995, Congress completed the
economic deregulation that it began under the Staggers Act, further
curtailing federal regulatory authority over the railroad industry. Under the
ICCTA, the new STB, as successor to the Commission, now had
jurisdiction over the economic regulation of both interstate and intrastate
lines, and the statute simultaneously “extend[ed] exclusive Federal
jurisdiction to matters relating to spur, industrial, team, switching or side
tracks formerly reserved for State jurisdiction under former section 10907.”
H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 95. While the ICCTA extended federal licensing
jurisdiction (for new construction, expansion, and abandonment of
interstate lines and for acquisition or operation of an existing interstate line
by a new carrier) to intrastate lines, it did not substantively change the
limited breadth of that licensing jurisdiction.
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The ICCTA included several conforming changes “to reflect the
direct and complete pre-emption of State economic regulations of
railroads.” Id. These changes included:
(1) deleting the language of prior section 10501(b) regarding federal
certification requirements for state rate-setting because state ratesetting was no longer allowed;
(2) moving the “jurisdiction” and “preemption” language of prior
section 10501(d) into section 10501(b); and
(3) deleting prior section 10907 language that exempted the construction
or extension of wholly intrastate rail lines from federal licensing
certification and adding new language to revised section 10501(b) to
clarify that “the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment,
or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks,
or facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to be located,
entirely in one State” in order to bring new intrastate infrastructure
activities within the STB’s certification jurisdiction.
49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(2) (emphasis added); see H.R. Rep. No. 104-422, at
167 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (“In light of the exclusive Federal authority over
auxiliary tracks and facilities, this subject is integrated into the statement of
general jurisdiction.”); S. Rep. No. 104-176, at 6 (1995) (“The bill would
also eliminate Federal certification and review procedures for State
regulation of intrastate rail transportation.”).
The House Conference Report on the ICCTA summarized the
purpose of these conforming revisions, including the “construction” and
“operation” language on which HSRA relies to argue incorrectly that the
STB has plenary jurisdiction:
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The changes include extending exclusive Federal jurisdiction to
matters relating to spur, industrial, team, switching or side tracks
formerly reserved for State jurisdiction under former section 10907.
The former disclaimer regarding residual State police powers is
eliminated as unnecessary, in view of the Federal policy of
occupying the entire field of economic regulation of the interstate
rail transportation system. Although States retain the police powers
reserved by the Constitution, the Federal scheme of economic
regulation and deregulation is intended to address and encompass
all such regulation and to be completely exclusive.
H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 95-96 (emphasis added). Thus, Congress did not
expand – or intend to expand – the scope of federal certification jurisdiction
over new railroad infrastructure; it merely extended that limited jurisdiction
to wholly intrastate activities that had previously been exempted in order to
complete the economic deregulation of the rail industry.
This more complete historical context reveals the critical flaw in
HSRA’s preemption argument. In crafting the ICCTA and its predecessors,
Congress was focused on the economic viability of the evolving railroad
system, and its statutory response reflects concern about the destabilizing
effect of state rate regulation and state-mandated overbuilding and
expansion of rail lines. As it stands today, the ICCTA gives the STB
carefully-circumscribed exclusive jurisdiction to (1) adjudicate complaints
concerning discriminatory rates or practices by common carriers (49 U.S.C.
§ 11701) and (2) grant or deny licenses for specific infrastructure activities
(new line construction, existing line extensions), change of operator status,
and abandonment of existing lines (49 U.S.C. §§ 10901, 10903). There is
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no evidence in the historic record that Congress even remotely intended to
create a federal agency with plenary railroad regulatory or planning
authority or to usurp a state’s traditional ability to make decisions that
protect public health and the environment.
C.

The ICCTA Does Not Convey STB Jurisdiction Over the
NCRA Rail Line Project or Expressly Preempt CEQA
Compliance for the Project.

HSRA’s preemption argument incorrectly elides two distinct ICCTA
directives – one addressing STB “exclusive jurisdiction” and the other
expressly preempting “remedies . . . with respect to regulation of rail
transportation.” As the plain language and structure of the ICCTA
demonstrates, neither of these directives prevents California from requiring
that NCRA’s proposed repair and reopening project undergo adequate
CEQA review or precludes citizens from ensuring that NCRA complies
with that requirement.
1.

The STB Lacks Jurisdiction Over NCRA’s
Proposed Repair Project.

Section 10501(b) provides “exclusive” STB “jurisdiction” over (1)
“transportation of rail carriers, and the remedies [provided by the ICCTA]
with respect to rates, classifications, rules (including car service,
interchange, and other operating rules), practices, routes, services, and
facilities of such carriers” and (2) “the construction, acquisition, operation,
abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side
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tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to be located,
entirely in one State.” 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b). As discussed above, this
statutory language was intended to displace state financial regulation and
infrastructure requirements that might undermine market competitiveness
in the rail industry.6
The reach of STB’s exclusive jurisdiction over construction and
operational activities in subdivision (b)(2) is, in turn, defined and
circumscribed by section 10901, which establishes procedures for
“Authorizing construction and operation of railroad lines.” Section
10901(a) provides that “[a] person may—(1) construct an extension to any
of its railroad lines; (2) construct an additional railroad line; (3) provide
transportation over, or by means of, an extended or additional railroad line;
or (4) in the case of a person other than a rail carrier, acquire a railroad line
or acquire or operate an extended or additional railroad line, only if the

6

The STB’s exclusive jurisdiction under subsection (b)(1) to adjudicate
disputes over allegations of discriminatory rates and other practices is not at
issue here. Chapter 111 of the ICCTA requires that common carriers
operating a railroad provide (i) transportation services upon reasonable
request, and (ii) nondiscriminatory access to terminal facilities, switch
connections, and side tracks. 49 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11103. If it receives a
complaint about a carrier’s failure to comply with these obligations, the
STB may begin an investigation and take appropriate action to compel
compliance. Id. § 11701. The STB also may pursue civil penalties against
a noncomplying rail carrier, and an injured party may seek money damages
against the carrier in federal district court. Id. §§ 11702, 11704, 11901.
Because subsection (b)(1) is not relevant here, Plaintiffs do not discuss it
further.
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Board issues a certificate authorizing such activity under subsection (c).”
49 U.S.C. § 10901(a) (emphasis added). STB has limited discretion in
exercising this jurisdiction. It must issue a certificate authorizing these
activities at the request of an applicant, “unless the Board finds that such
activities are inconsistent with the public convenience and necessity.” Id. §
10901(c).
Thus, consistent with the ICCTA’s legislative history and Congress’
statutory policy findings (see 49 U.S.C. § 10101), section 10501(b)(2)’s
jurisdictional provisions and section 10901(a) work together to (1) prohibit
states from regulating railroad rates or mandating new lines or service
extensions and (2) prevent the STB from unduly impeding a railroad’s
business decision to move forward with new construction, acquisition, or
operation of lines or facilities. The statute does not empower the STB,
however, to compel a rail carrier to construct, acquire or operate a new line
or extend an existing line. Nor does it authorize the STB to intrude on the
business judgments and decisions of any railroad (private or public)
concerning whether to undertake such activities.7

7

Section 10903 of the ICCTA provides a somewhat more rigorous STB
process in connection with potential abandonment of an existing line or
discontinuance of service. A rail carrier must submit a detailed application
identifying the service and labor impacts of the proposed abandonment or
discontinuance, and the STB must grant the action if it “finds that the
present or future public convenience and necessity require or permit the
abandonment or discontinuance.” 49 U.S.C. § 10903(d). The rail line at
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When it granted the change of operator request and authorized
NWPCo to become the potential future carrier on the NCRA line, the STB
was doing only that – qualifying a potential new operator. The STB’s
section 10901(a) licensing authority over new operators, new owners, and
extensions of existing lines and construction of new lines is strictly reactive
to carrier or other affected party applications. Like most licensing bodies,
the STB may grant or deny a request for one of the enumerated activities in
section 10901(a), in response to an application, but Congress did not charge
the agency with affirmative responsibility or authority for directing such
activities.
Most critical here, the STB does not have – and has never asserted –
any section 10901(a) authority or statutory jurisdiction over the
rehabilitation and repair work necessary to reopen the NCRA line. RB:13;
Lee’s Summit, Mo. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 231 F.3d 39, 42 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (STB lacks jurisdiction over line rehabilitation); Detroit/Wayne
County Port Auth. v. I.C.C., 59 F.3d 1314, 1317-18 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(jurisdiction does not extend to improvements of existing track). As the
STB itself has often explained, “Congress’ purpose in enacting the
issue here was shut down by federal order and can be reopened only at
substantial cost to California taxpayers. The question of whether the line
thereby has been or may be permanently “abandoned” is not before the
Court in this case. Rather, it is a question for another day, should
California decide not to resume operations and instead abandon the line.
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Transportation Act of 1920 [was] to encourage railroads to maintain and
improve existing services, thereby strengthening their common carrier
abilities, before spending capital constructing a new line or extending an
existing one to serve new customers.” Union Pac. R.R. Co.—Petition for
Declaratory Order—Rehabilitation of Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Between Jude
and Ogden Junction, Tex., FD No. 33611, 3 S.T.B. 646, 1998 WL 525587,
at *3 (S.T.B. Aug. 19, 1998) (finding no STB jurisdiction over carrier’s
repair and reopening of an inactive existing line). Consistent with this
purpose, “the construction of an extension to a rail line, or an additional rail
line, is one that enables a carrier to penetrate or invade a new market” and
therefore falls within section 10901, while the “rehabilitation and
reactivation” of an existing line does not implicate such concerns and thus
“does not come within the Board’s section 10901 jurisdiction.” Id. at *3-4
(citing Tex. & Pac. v. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry., 270 U.S. 266 (1926)).8
Even where, as here, the STB has approved a change in the owner
and operator status of an existing line, “no STB authority is necessary when
a carrier proposes to improve or relocate an existing line without extending
8

See also BNSF Ry.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD No. 35164, 2009
WL 1416468, at *8 (S.T.B. May 19, 2009); City of Stafford, Tex. v. S. Pac.
Transp. Co., FD No. 32395, 1994 WL 613381, at *8 (I.C.C. Oct. 28, 1994),
aff’d, City of Stafford v. ICC, 69 F.3d 535 (5th Cir. 1995); Denver & Rio
Grande W.R.R.—Joint Constr. Project-Relocation Over Burlington N.R.R.,
FD 30733, 41 I.C.C.2d 95, 97, 1987 WL 97286, at *2 (I.C.C. Oct. 20,
1987).
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the railroad’s territory.” Swanson Rail Transfer, LB—Declaratory Order—
Swanson Rail Yard Terminal, FD No. 37354, 2011 WL 2356468, at *2-3
(S.T.B. June 13, 2011) (finding no STB jurisdiction over rehabilitation and
reactivation of line that “will not take . . . rail service into any new territory
or market” and noting that the new carrier had already obtained state
environmental permits for the work). The STB’s approval of NWPCo’s
application for a change in operator status is not, accordingly, a federal
mandate to repair and reopen the line. Under the ICCTA “construction and
operation” language on which HSRA’s argument hinges, the STB could no
more order NCRA to reopen its line than could the DMV order someone to
drive whose license has been revoked.
Because no STB decision was required for NCRA’s rehabilitation
and reopening project, no federal environmental review was required for
those activities. E.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co., 1998 WL 525587, at *5. The
STB’s only consideration of environmental issues came in connection with
its August 30, 2007, notice authorizing NWPCo as the qualified future
carrier on the line once the lease transaction was consummated and “after
repairs” were completed. AR:16:8207, 8540. In that notice, the STB
concluded that NWPCo’s “anticipated operations would be below the
threshold requiring the Board's environmental review” in its governing
regulations and therefore rejected Friends of the Eel River’s appeal of that
decision. See AR:16:8539-42. The STB never considered the
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environmental impacts associated with the line repair and reopening project
that is the subject of the challenged EIR because such activities fall outside
of its jurisdiction.
HSRA’s suggestion that the STB made a permitting decision or
considered environmental review for the project and that “federal law
provides avenues to challenge the decision” is, therefore, incorrect.
HSRA:17-18. Because NCRA’s line repair project does not involve
construction, acquisition, or extension of a line under section 10901, or the
abandonment or discontinuance of a line under section 10903, there is no
federal authority over the project and no federal “remedy” available to
Plaintiffs.9
The absence of STB jurisdiction over the NCRA repair and
reopening project distinguishes this case from Town of Atherton v.
California High-Speed Rail Authority, 228 Cal. App. 4th 314 (2014), where
the STB asserted section 10901 licensing jurisdiction over the proposed
construction of a new high-speed rail line, and the U.S. Department of
Transportation prepared an elaborate Environmental Impact Statement
(“EIS”) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act to accompany

9

True, the STB’s decision to grant NWPCo’s common carrier certification
without any environmental review was subject to administrative challenge,
and Plaintiff Friends of the Eel River, in fact, challenged it. AR:16:82818347. But there is no federal venue to challenge NCRA’s environmental
review for the repair project.
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HSRA’s EIR. The joint “programmatic” EIR/EIS and subsequent projectlevel EIR/EIS for each segment of the high-speed rail project collectively
span thousands of pages and contain extensive analysis for construction and
operation impacts associated the new line.
Here, by contrast, there is (and will be) no federal environmental
review because NCRA’s repair activities fall outside of the STB’s
jurisdiction. Unless the repair occurs, there is no “operation” on the line
subject to STB jurisdiction. The proposed rehabilitation project, funded by
California taxpayers, may have significant adverse environmental impacts.
Under California law, NCRA must therefore complete an EIR that
meaningfully discloses those impacts to the public and identifies mitigation
that may lessen or avoid them. If the Court finds that CEQA is preempted
here, there will be no state or federal environmental review of any kind
completed for the next phase of potentially damaging repair work along the
Eel River Division of the line.10

10

Specifically, the EIR at issue here concerns only the repair of the Russian
River Division of the line, not that portion of the line that runs through the
Eel River Canyon corridor. The dilapidated condition of that segment
reveals the enormous amount of physical work – and attendant
environmental impact – involved in any repair effort. Hard Times on the
Railroad: Eel River Canyon, YouTube (May 26, 2009),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RhCjYNKXNvk.
Moreover, as a matter of law, whether any portion of the line is currently
operating (legally or illegally) is irrelevant to the issue before this Court.
The point in time relevant to this CEQA challenge is the date that the EIR
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2.

Section 10501(b) Does Not Expressly or
Categorically Preempt CEQA.

Separate from its jurisdictional language, section 10501(b) also
provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies provided
under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are
exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law.”
49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (emphasis added). On its face, this provision does
not “categorically preempt” state actions merely because they may
incidentally affect operation of a rail line in some way. As Plaintiffs
explained in their prior briefs, CEQA does not “regulate rail transportation”
– it is a decisionmaking and political accountability tool – and thus does not
fall within the ICCTA’s express preemption clause. OB:14-27, 52-59;
RB:3-12.
This Court’s recent decision in People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor
Transportation, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 772 (2014), is instructive. There, the
Court found that California’s action to enforce state labor and insurance
requirements through the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) was not
preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act
(“FAAAA”), which expressly precludes states from enacting or enforcing
“a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law
was certified. At that time, the line was not operating. See, e.g.,
App:14:104:3768 (NCRA will not permit the operation until the EIR is
certified).
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related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to
the transportation of property.” Id. at 775. This preemption language was
borrowed from the Airline Deregulation Act, which Congress adopted to
prevent states from undoing federal efforts to deregulate the industry. Id. at
779; Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008).
Both this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have noted that the preemption
language of the ICCTA, enacted a year after the FAAAA, is quite similar.
Id.
In Pac Anchor, the Attorney General (who represents HSRA here)
argued that the FAAAA did not expressly preempt California’s UCL claim
because the underlying state laws on which it was based were not
specifically “related to” price, route or service involving the “transportation
of property.” Pac Anchor, 59 Cal. 4th at 782-83. This Court agreed,
finding no express preemption: “[H]ere the FAAAA embodies Congress’s
concerns about the regulation of motor carriers with respect to the
transportation of property; a UCL action that is based on an alleged general
violation of labor and employment laws does not implicate those concerns.”
Id. at 783. Likewise here, the ICCTA embodies congressional concern
about remedies related to the regulation of rail transportation; a claim
seeking to hold NCRA accountable for adequate environmental review
under CEQA does not implicate those concerns.
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HSRA argues that CEQA nonetheless constitutes a facially
preempted “preclearance” requirement because, in its view, CEQA
litigation: (1) “can prevent a public railroad from proceeding with an STBauthorized project” (HSRA:14) or “can be used to deny the public railroad
the right to engage in activities the STB has authorized” (HSRA:16); and
(2) “has the effect of regulating ‘matters directly regulated by the Board –
such as the construction, operation, and abandonment of rail lines.’”
(HSRA:16).
Notably, these arguments do not constitute an “express preemption”
defense, as HSRA suggests. The ICCTA’s plain text and legislative history
say nothing about “preclearance” requirements. Moreover, as a factual
matter, the rail line rehabilitation work analyzed in the EIR is not, as
explained above, “an STB-approved project.” Most important, compliance
with CEQA prior to commencing the repair project does not “regulate” rail
transportation or in any way impinge upon the STB’s exclusive jurisdiction
to approve applications for new or extended lines, service, and operators.
HSRA at times claims that its express preemption argument is
limited to CEQA’s enforcement remedies and does not address whether
CEQA is preempted in general. HSRA:9, n.3, 14-20. Yet in other places,
HSRA claims that CEQA is preempted in its entirety. See, e.g., HSRA:4647 (agencies’ obligation to “comply with CEQA’s procedural and
substantive mandates” for rail projects is contrary to the ICCTA’s purpose),
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49 (when applied to public rail agencies, “CEQA is effectively
regulatory”), 52 (the ICCTA preempts state regulation of rail
transportation).
The amicus brief that the Attorney General submitted on behalf of
the California Environmental Protection Agency, et al. (“Resources
Agencies”), on the other hand, observes that “CEQA is largely procedural,
and its directives apply to public agencies.” Resources Agencies Brief at
15 (“Agency:15”). The Resources Agencies thus recognize that the ICCTA
does not expressly preempt CEQA’s application to rail projects – i.e., that
such an argument is “overbroad.” Agency:15. Indeed, the Resources
Agencies agree not only that CEQA is not preempted generally, but that
California environmental laws adopted under the state’s historic police
powers, including enforcement remedies, often are not preempted.
Agency:21-23.
The Resources Agencies attempt to soften the conflict between the
Attorney General’s two briefs by claiming that preemption somehow
operates with greater force where judicial remedies are sought against
public agencies that have a single purpose to own and operate a “federallylicensed railroad line.” Agency:16. This argument ignores that the
Attorney General and California environmental enforcement agencies –
including some amici here – have brought judicial enforcement actions
against NCRA for numerous violations of California environmental laws.
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See App:8:77b:2027-51. Moreover, ICCTA preemption operates with less,
not greater, force in situations involving public rail agencies’ obligation to
comply with California law. See Sections II-III.
The decision whether to proceed with rehabilitation and reopening of
the line is wholly within the discretion of a California public agency. If a
railroad (private or public) decides to undertake such a project, some facet
of its future activities (line extension, new operator status, etc.) may require
STB certification, and the STB’s approval or denial of that certification
may be subject to the ICCTA’s exclusive remedies. But there are no
federal “remedies” or “avenues to challenge” capital investment decisions
outside of the STB’s circumscribed jurisdiction. This lawsuit cannot
possibly “have the effect of second-guessing fully considered decisions
already made by the STB” (HSRA:18) because there were no such
decisions.
D.

There Is No Implied or “As Applied” Preemption of
CEQA Compliance or Litigation in This Case.

In the alternative, HSRA argues that, even if section 10501(b) does
not expressly preempt CEQA environmental review, Plaintiffs’
enforcement of the law is preempted “as applied” because the potentially
available judicial remedies “would have the effect of preventing or
unreasonably interfering with railroad transportation.” HSRA:18-19. This
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is simply a different label for the “preclearance” argument, but Plaintiffs
address it here again under the “implied preemption” test.
As a threshold matter, any “as applied” preemption analysis must be
conducted on a case-by-case basis. The Resources Agencies make this
point forcefully and repeatedly, explaining that the ICCTA generally does
not preempt laws of general applicability enacted under the state’s
traditional police powers, and that the question of “whether ICCTA
preempts any particular exercise of police powers by the Environmental
Agencies must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Agency:23; see
generally Agency:21-23. Here a trial was held. While Defendants raised a
general preemption defense in their answers (App:15:110:4053, 115:4248),
they failed to satisfy their factual burden to establish implied preemption.
In briefing, they argued “categorical” and “facial” preemption, without
proffering facts necessary for the “as-applied” fact-based analysis. See
App:9:83:2328-31; see also Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 593
F.3d 404, 413, 415 (5th Cir. 2010).
Tellingly, the Attorney General recently obtained dismissal of a rail
industry ICCTA preemption challenge to new state legislation imposing oil
spill contingency plan and financial responsibility requirements on railroads
transporting oil, arguing for a fact-based inquiry:
ICCTA does not preempt all state regulation affecting rail
transportation. . . . The question of whether a state regulation is
permissible under ICCTA is inherently fact-intensive. . . . The Court
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must analyze each individual regulation to determine whether it is
preempted by ICCTA, considering whether the regulations are
reasonable, certain, and non-discriminatory.
Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion
to Dismiss Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 14, Ass’n of
Am. R.Rs. v. Cal. Office of Spill Prevention and Response, Case No. 2:14cv-02354-TLN-CKD (E.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014).11 Similarly here,
Defendants identify no facts showing that this lawsuit “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)
(articulating the test for conflict preemption).
Even assuming Plaintiffs prevail and the court remands this matter to
NCRA for further environmental review or the consideration of additional
mitigation measures (and even assuming that NCRA decides to cancel the
project), there is no implied or “as applied” preemption here. Implied
“conflict pre-emption exists where ‘compliance with both state and federal
law is impossible,’ or where ‘the state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.’’” Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015)

11

See Exhibit A to Plaintiffs’ Second Request for Judicial Notice.
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(quoting California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100, 101
(1989)).12
The U.S. Supreme Court in Oneok emphasized “the importance of
considering the target at which the state law aims in determining whether
that law is pre-empted.” 135 S. Ct. at 1599. There, the Court held that a
state antitrust lawsuit for false price reporting, wash trades, and
anticompetitive collusive behavior was not preempted by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission’s jurisdiction over interstate natural gas
rates, including federal authority to issue rules and regulations to prevent
“any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” for interstate sales.
Id. at 1598, 1603. In so holding, the Court emphasized that the target of the
antitrust lawsuit (collusive retail rates) was properly actionable under a
state law of general applicability, even though application of that law
“might well raise pipelines’ operating costs, and thus the costs of wholesale
natural gas transportation.” Id. at 1601.

12

As Plaintiffs explained in their Opening Brief, the implied preemption
test is not, as NCRA and now HSRA suggest, whether CEQA will
“unreasonably interfere with” or “unduly burden” interstate rail
transportation. OB:54 n.7. Those words are part of the test for determining
whether a state action violates the Dormant Commerce Clause. Defendants
have not raised a Dormant Commerce Clause defense here, nor could they.
Similarly, given STB’s limited jurisdiction (discussed above) and
Congress’ expressed intent to preserve state police powers, no party has
argued “field” preemption here.
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Similarly, after finding no express preemption under the FAAAA,
this Court in Pac Anchor also rejected defendants’ “as applied” preemption
argument. 59 Cal. 4th at 784-87. That defense was based, in part, on the
idea that a successful UCL suit would drive up the cost of doing business
and thereby affect market forces. Id. at 785. The Court followed the lead
of the U.S. Supreme Court in Dan’s City Used Car, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133 S.
Ct. 1769 (2013), which held that state law consumer protection claims were
not within the “target at which [Congress] aimed” in the FAAAA; that
target was “a State’s direct substitution of its own governmental commands
for competitive market forces.” Pac Anchor, 59 Cal. 4th at 785 (quoting
Dan’s City). The ICCTA takes aim at the same target. As it did in Pan
Anchor, therefore, this Court should read the ICCTA’s preemption of
remedies related to the economic regulation of rail transportation narrowly
to accommodate state environmental laws of general applicability designed
to inform public agencies, and the public, of a project’s impacts before
deciding on a course of action.
HSRA fails to address Pac Anchor, Dan’s City, and Oneok, although
these recent high court cases are directly relevant here. As was true for the
generally applicable state law at issue in each of them, CEQA does not
target rail transportation or stand as an obstacle to accomplishing
Congress’s intent to deregulate the rail industry and make the market more
competitive. To the contrary, California’s purchase of the failed North
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Coast line and the proposed major rehabilitation project are efforts to make
this railroad financially viable. But just as NCRA cannot, for example,
operate the line in violation of California anti-fraud law or shield itself from
state contract law merely because its business involves operation of a
railroad, neither can NCRA – as a public agency – escape its environmental
review obligations under CEQA by pretending that STB has “plenary”
authority over the state’s project to rehabilitate the line and reestablish
service.
II.

The Nixon Clear-Statement Rule Applies to California’s
Governance of Its Subdivision Rail Agencies.
Reading section 10501(b) to preempt CEQA here would run afoul of

the clear-statement rule articulated in Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League,
541 U.S. 125 (2004), and Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
HSRA contends that California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957), and related
cases carved out an exception to this precedent for public rail agencies. But
there is no exception to the clear-statement doctrine in cases involving
public rail agencies, and section 10501(b) does not contain unmistakably
clear language preempting NRCA’s obligation to comply with CEQA. For
these reasons alone, this case is not preempted.
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A.

Nixon and Gregory Govern the Interpretation of Section
10501(b); They Are Not the Basis of a Tenth Amendment
Challenge.

HSRA first misconstrues Plaintiffs’ discussion of California’s
sovereign interest in self-governance and democratic accountability, as well
as the relevance of Nixon and Gregory. Contrary to HSRA’s assumption,
Plaintiffs have not raised a constitutional challenge to section 10501(b)’s
application here. HSRA:27-30. Rather, Nixon and Gregory establish a rule
of statutory interpretation that requires an unmistakably clear statement
from Congress before a court will read federal statutes, including section
10501(b), to interfere with California’s arrangements for conducting its
own governance. Nixon, 541 U.S. at 140.
Federalism concerns do, however, undergird the clear-statement
doctrine. This rule “acknowledg[es] that the States retain substantial
sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which
Congress does not readily interfere.” Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461. As
Gregory explained, since the federal political process is the primary
“protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress’
Commerce Clause powers, [courts] must be absolutely certain that
Congress intended such an exercise.” Id. at 464 (emphasis added) (citing
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
HSRA’s discussion of the failed Tenth Amendment challenges in
Taylor and United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), as well as of
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the evolution of the Supreme Court’s Tenth Amendment jurisprudence,
misses the point. HSRA:28-30. None of these cases, which predate Nixon
and Gregory, involve the statutory interpretation issue presented here.13
B.

The Clear-Statement Rule Does Not Make Exceptions for
Cases Involving State Governance of Public Rail
Agencies.

NCRA occupies two roles. It is a common carrier that has entered
the rail market and is subject to federal rail regulations. See Taylor, 353
U.S. at 568. But NCRA also is a public agency created by the Legislature
and bound by the public laws of this state, including CEQA. Gov’t Code
§§ 93000-93034.; Mountain Lion Found. v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 16 Cal.
4th 105, 112 (1997).
In Gregory, the Supreme Court recognized that the clear-statement
requirement protects state laws that go “beyond an area traditionally
regulated by the States” and are instead “most fundamental” to a state’s
character as a sovereign entity. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460. Gregory held
13

HSRA incorrectly suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court “rejected” the
application of a clear-statement principle in United States v. California.
HSRA:28. The Court actually evaluated a different cannon of construction:
the presumption that a sovereign is not “bound by its own statute unless
named.” United States v. California, 297 U.S. at 186 (emphasis added); see
also Taylor, 353 U.S. at 562 (discussing same). Unlike the clear-statement
rule, this cannon does not require an “explicitly stated” congressional intent
to bind “the enacting sovereign” (i.e., the U.S. government) when such
intent can be fairly inferred from a statute. United States v. California, 297
U.S. at 186. By contrast, the clear statement rule articulated decades later
in Nixon and Gregory focuses on whether Congress clearly intended to
preempt state sovereign functions.

36

that courts must be certain Congress intended to infringe on such sovereign
interests before reading a statute to “upset the usual constitutional balance
of the federal and state powers.” Id. at 460-61 (finding no unmistakably
clear intent in a federal age discrimination statute to preempt state-adopted
age limits for state judges). As the Court recognized in Nixon, a state’s
“chosen disposition of its own power” and control of a subsidiary agency
are core sovereign interests. Nixon, 541 U.S. at 140-41; see also City of
Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 437
(2002) (“[w]hether and how” a state grants powers to its subdivisions “is a
question central to state self-government”). This Court similarly has
recognized that California’s sovereign power encompasses control over its
subdivisions. See Cal. Redevelopment Ass’n v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th
231, 254-55 (2011) (quoting Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79
(1907)) (“The number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon
[public agencies] . . . rests in the absolute discretion of the State”); In re
Sanitary Bd. of E. Fruitvale Sanitary Dist., 158 Cal. 453, 457 (1910)
(same); In re Pfahler, 150 Cal. 71, 79 (1906) (same).
In United States v. California and Taylor, the Supreme Court did not
address these core sovereign functions but instead found that, after entering
the rail market, a state railroad could not operate in violation of federal law.
Specifically, United States v. California held that the State Belt Railroad
was not immune from enforcement of a federal statute requiring that rail
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carriers use automatic couplers between railcars. 297 U.S. at 180, 184-86.
The Court rejected the Belt Railroad’s argument that its status as a state
entity removed its obligation to comply with this congressional regulation
of interstate rail. Id. at 183-86.
In Taylor, the Supreme Court considered the applicability of federal
law to the Belt Railroad once more. The Court addressed a conflict
between the Railway Labor Act, which granted collective bargaining rights
to employees of rail carriers, and California civil service laws, which forbid
such collective bargaining rights for state employees. Taylor, 353 U.S. at
559-60. Again the Belt Railroad argued that it was not bound by federal
regulation of rail carriers, and again the Court rejected that argument. The
Court held that, once California entered the interstate rail market, the “State
may not prohibit the exercise of [labor] rights which the federal Acts
protect.” Id. at 560. Because California’s labor law was directly hostile to
the collective-bargaining rights guaranteed by the Railway Labor Act, state
law had to give way. Id. at 560-61, 65-67; see also United Transp. Union
v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 681 (1982) (requiring a public
railroad to comply with the Railway Labor Act did not violate the Tenth
Amendment because “operation of a railroad engaged in interstate
commerce is not clearly an integral part of traditional state activities”).
These cases – like other cases that HSRA relies on – stand for the
limited proposition that state rail carriers must comply with federal rail
38

regulations governing the interstate rail market. See, e.g., City of New
Orleans v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 195 F.2d 887, 889 (5th Cir. 1952) (public
railroad subject to federal law “so long as it engages in interstate and
foreign commerce”). Contrary to HSRA’s argument, however, these cases
do not go further and preempt state statutes that are unrelated to federal rail
regulation and that instead only govern public state and local entities
generally.14 Cf. Pac Anchor, 59 Cal. 4th at 783-84 (upholding California’s
generally-applicable unfair competition law that did not directly regulate
matters covered by the FAAAA). There is no conflict between California’s
interests in making public rail authorities comply with CEQA and the
holdings in United States v. California and Taylor.
Further, HSRA’s preemption argument focuses exclusively on
federal requirements applied to rail carriers, arguing that they displace
state-law obligations that otherwise control California agencies. HSRA:3034. Yet this exclusive focus on federal law conflicts with the analysis
required by clear-statement precedent. “The Supreme Court has applied
Gregory [by] focusing on the state functions necessarily affected by
operation of the [federal] statute, and not exclusively on the actual conduct
14

STB decisions addressing federal regulation of public railroads
(HSRA:32-33) are also irrelevant. NCRA’s obligation to comply with
federal law is undisputed. To the extent that HSRA asks this Court to read
these decisions as limiting California’s sovereign authority over its
subdivisions, the Court should decline to do so. Solid Waste Agency of N.
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-74 (2001).
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proscribed by Congress.” United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech.
Institute, Inc., 173 F.3d 870, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1999). This one-sided analysis
leads HSRA to overlook the important sovereign interests that would be
nullified by preemption in this case, and assumes a conflict between CEQA
and Congress’ power to regulate rail where none exists.
As previously explained, through CEQA, the Legislature established
requirements for public-agency decisionmaking and accountability when
agencies take actions that may cause significant environmental impacts.
OB:29-32, 36; RB:18. CEQA is but one of many agency-governance and
accountability statutes through which California exercises sovereign control
over its subdivisions. See Nixon, 541 U.S. at 140-41; see also Gov’t Code
§§ 6250-6277 (California Public Records Act); §§ 11120-11132 (BagleyKeene Act); §§ 54950-71132 (Brown Act); §§ 81000-91094 (Political
Reform Act).
In fact, the sovereign interests that CEQA advances extend further
than the self-governance principles that Nixon protected. California
expresses its sovereignty through laws that reach the heart of representative
government in this State. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461; Agua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 4th 239, 249, 256-59 (2006)
(acknowledging that the Political Reform Act’s regulation of electoral
process furthers “a state interest that is beyond . . . commercial and
regulatory interests”). This Court has held that CEQA’s environmental
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review process facilitates informed democracy by promoting agency
accountability to the electorate. An EIR “is a document of accountability.
If CEQA is scrupulously followed, the public will know the basis on which
its responsible officials either approve or reject environmentally significant
action, and the public, being duly informed, can respond accordingly to
action with which it disagrees.” Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 47 Cal. 3d 376, 392 (1988); see also Concerned
Citizens of Costa Mesa, Inc. v. 32nd Dist. Agricultural Ass’n, 42 Cal. 3d
929, 936 (1986) (the “privileged position” that the public holds in the
CEQA process “is based . . . on notions of democratic decision-making”).
Consequently, requiring an agency “to fully comply with the letter of
[CEQA],” including its public disclosure provisions, facilitates “appropriate
action come election day should a majority of the voters disagree” with an
agency’s decision. People v. County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 842
(1974).
For these reasons, the sovereignty issues here reach further than
those in Nixon. There, the state sovereignty at stake was limited to the
state’s authority to control its subsidiary agencies. CEQA serves a similar
purpose, but because it is also an instrument that California selected to
enhance political accountability in public decisionmaking, the clearstatement requirement operates with greater force here.
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The facts in Nixon further demonstrate why preemption of CEQA is
unavailable here. Like regulation of railways, regulation of the
telecommunications industry falls well within Congress’ commerce power.
Unlike the STB’s limited regulatory authority, however, Congress chose to
give broad regulatory authority to the Federal Communications
Commission. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700
(1984) (Congress gave the FCC “broad responsibilities to regulate all
aspects of interstate communication”); Freeman v. Burlington Broads.,
Inc., 204 F.3d 311, 320 (2d Cir. 2000) (recognizing “the FCC’s broad
authority” over telecommunications). Despite this broad federal authority
over telecommunications, Nixon refused to uniformly apply, to both state
and private telecommunication providers, Congress’ prohibition on states
restricting the “ability of any entity” to offer telecommunication services.
Nixon, 541 U.S. at 140-41.
Moreover, Nixon resolved a much greater conflict between Missouri
law and federal law than is alleged to exist between CEQA and the ICCTA.
In Nixon, Missouri’s law specifically targeted the subject matter of the
Telecommunications Act’s preemption clause – the entry of “an entity”
(i.e., a municipality) into the telecommunications market. Nixon, 541 U.S.
at 129. Nonetheless, the Court would not read that federal preemption
clause to interfere with the state’s control over telecommunication services
offered by its subdivision. Id. at 140-41. Here, while ICCTA preemption
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is limited to state regulation of rail transportation, CEQA does not target
the railroad industry. As a law of general application, CEQA’s effect on
railroads is, at most, indirect and incidental. Compared with Nixon, it is
even harder to find congressional intent to preempt how California controls
public railroads through CEQA.
If a conflict did arise between California’s exercise of its sovereign
interests through CEQA and federal regulation in the ICCTA, Nixon and
Gregory still require an unmistakably clear statement before the state’s
sovereign interest gives way. But HSRA, like Defendants, is unable to
identify any ICCTA text or legislative history that clearly shows
congressional intent to preempt state control of the decisionmaking
processes of public rail agencies. The “context of section 10501(b)”
(HSRA:34) does not suffice.
C.

The Court Should Be Skeptical of Rail Agencies’
Attempts to Shed the Legislature’s and the People’s
Sovereign Control.

In enacting California’s open-meeting laws, the Brown Act and the
Bagley-Keene Act, the Legislature observed that the people of California
“do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies that serve them.” Gov’t
Code §§ 11120, 54950. To the contrary, “the people insist on remaining
informed so that they may retain control over the [agencies] they have
created.” Id.
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Though it is subject to the sovereign control of the Legislature and
the electorate, HSRA purports to represent the views of “the State”
regarding ICCTA preemption of CEQA. See HSRA:2. But HSRA is
simply the agency that the Legislature created to pursue California’s high
speed rail project. See Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 185020-185511. HSRA
does not speak for the State any more than other public agencies in
California. Cf. In re Pfahler, 150 Cal. at 80 (defining “state” to encompass
“the entire body of the people, who together form the body politic, known
as the ‘state’”).
Indeed, the amicus briefs in this case reveal marked disagreement
among California agencies regarding the ICCTA’s preemptive reach. As a
single-purpose rail agency, HSRA’s desire for ICCTA preemption is
understandably aligned with NCRA. But other agencies established by the
Legislature recognize the impropriety of extending ICCTA preemption to
this case. See Brief of Amici Curiae South Coast Air Quality Management
District and Bay Area Air Quality Management District. Even the position
taken by the California Environmental Protection Agency and the Natural
Resources Agency is in tension with the position of HSRA and NCRA. See
Section I.C.
As discussed, HSRA and NCRA must comply with numerous
California laws (including CEQA) that apply only to public agencies in this
state. Indeed, the Legislature has imposed specific obligations on HSRA.
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See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 185033-185511 (requirements for
submitting business plans to the Legislature); § 185033.5 (requirements for
submitting project update reports to the Secretary of Transportation);
§ 185036.1 (requirement relating to purchasing California-made
equipment). Rail agencies like HSRA and NCRA cannot, solely by virtue
of their rail carrier status, disregard such directives from the Legislature and
their ultimate responsibility to the people of California.
Because “preempting state or local governmental self-regulation (or
regulation of political inferiors) would work so differently from preempting
regulation of private players,” Nixon found “it highly unlikely that
Congress intended to set off on such uncertain adventures.” Nixon, 541
U.S. at 126. The Court should be similarly skeptical of HSRA’s and
NCRA’s attempt to shed their statutory obligations, and should preserve
California’s sovereign control over these subdivisions.
III.

The ICCTA Does Not Preempt CEQA’s Requirements
Pertaining to State Proprietary Conduct.
In addition to the clear-statement doctrine, the market participant

doctrine defeats preemption here. In authorizing HSRA and NCRA to use
public funds and resources to pursue opportunities in the rail market, the
State acted as a proprietor of public property. Under the market participant
doctrine, courts presume that state and local requirements governing such
market activities are not preempted unless Congress evidences contrary
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intent. In Atherton, HSRA unsuccessfully argued against the market
participant doctrine, contending that it does not save from ICCTA
preemption CEQA’s requirements for the State’s proprietary rail projects.
HSRA renews that failed argument here. But despite HSRA’s contention,
the market participant doctrine is both “available” in the context of ICCTA
preemption and defeats any such preemption here.
A.

The Market Participant Doctrine Applies to Preemption
Under the ICCTA.

Some courts conduct a threshold inquiry to determine whether the
market participant doctrine is available under a particular statutory scheme.
They consider whether a statute “contains ‘any express or implied
indication by Congress’” that it intended to preempt state proprietary
activities. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 498 F.3d
1031, 1042 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
Associated Builders & Contractors, 507 U.S. 218, 231 (1993)) (“Boston
Harbor”)).
HSRA claims that Atherton was wrongly decided because it
supposedly failed to undertake this analysis. HSRA:41. Atherton,
however, recognized this threshold inquiry but found that HSRA impliedly
conceded “that the [market participant] doctrine applies” to ICCTA
preemption by expressly reserving HSRA’s right to assert the doctrine in
future ICCTA preemption cases. 228 Cal. App. 4th at 337 n.5.
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HSRA now turns away from that earlier concession by arguing that
the ICCTA will never accommodate the market participant doctrine. The
ICCTA does not support HSRA’s new position. The statute does not
contain an express statement preempting states’ proprietary decisions
regarding rail transportation. Consequently, HSRA contends that the
ICCTA impliedly preempts proprietary decisionmaking, arguing that
applying the market participant doctrine here “would be contrary to both
congressional and state intent.” HSRA:40. HSRA is incorrect on both
counts.
First, there is no “state intent” to remove either NCRA or HSRA
from their respective obligations to comply with CEQA when carrying out
State proprietary activities. The Legislature has never exempted these rail
agencies from CEQA. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 93000-93034 (lacking
CEQA exemption for NCRA); Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 185000-185511
(lacking CEQA exemption for HSRA). Instead, the Legislature has
repeatedly assumed that both agencies must comply with the Act. For
instance, the Legislature appropriated over $60 million to NCRA under the
State’s Transportation Congestion Relief Program, which anticipates that
funded agencies will comply with CEQA. Cal. Gov’t Code §§
14556.40(a)(32), 14556.13(b)(1) 14556.50(e), (i); see also App:9:84:2373
(Relief Program funding guidelines making recipient agencies responsible
for “[c]omplying with all legal requirements . . . including . . . CEQA”).
47

The Legislature likewise presented the Proposition 1A funding plan for the
high-speed rail project to California’s voters for approval, expecting that
HSRA would continue to comply with CEQA. Atherton, 228 Cal. App. 4th
at 338; see also Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 185033 (biennial business plans to
the Legislature include the “expected schedule for completing
environmental review . . . for each segment or combination of segments of
Phase 1” of that project).
Nor did Congress, in enacting the ICCTA, impliedly preempt state
proprietary activity in the rail market. HSRA primarily argues that
applying the market participant doctrine here is contrary to the ICCTA’s
“preemption principles” and would defeat Congress’s intent “to have
uniform and exclusive federal regulation.” HSRA:39-40. But this is not
the correct threshold inquiry. Instead, courts consider only whether
“Congress intended to extend the [federal statute’s] reach to preempt state
proprietary action.” Engine Mfrs., 498 F.3d at 1043. Nothing in the
ICCTA implies that Congress intended to foreclose state proprietary
activity in the rail market. Rather, numerous cases cited by HSRA
acknowledge that public entities can enter the rail market, just like private
entities. See HSRA:40.
Moreover, while HSRA acknowledges the deregulatory purpose of
the ICCTA (HSRA:24-25), it fails to reconcile its “uniformity” argument
with the largely-deregulated rail market. The goal of both the Staggers Act
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and the ICCTA was to reduce federal regulation over interstate rail and
encourage free market activity. See Section I; 49 U.S.C. § 10101(2)
(statutory policy “to minimize the need for Federal regulatory control over
the rail transportation system”). Deregulation allows both public and
private entities to decide for themselves how to engage the rail market, and
Congress likely expected that Burlington Northern, Union Pacific, and the
State of California would make these decisions differently, not uniformly.
Nothing in the ICCTA forecloses either private or state proprietors from
setting their own criteria governing such decisions. Cf. Tocher v. City of
Santa Ana, 219 F.3d 1040, 1048-50 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding public
market participation despite the FAAAA preemption clause intended to set
national standards for conducting towing business), abrogated on other
grounds in City of Columbus, 536 U.S. at 432.
Likewise, applying the market participant doctrine in ICCTA
preemption cases does not intrude on the STB’s limited jurisdiction. The
STB never “specifically authorized” NCRA’s repair activities here.
HSRA:41; see Section I. Moreover, grants of federal regulatory
jurisdiction do not by themselves demonstrate congressional intent to
preempt state market behavior. See Engine Mfrs., 498 F.3d at 1042-43
(market participant doctrine available despite EPA’s regulatory jurisdiction
under the Clean Air Act); Atherton, 228 Cal. App. 4th at 329-41 (applying
the market participant doctrine to ICCTA preemption claim after the STB
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exercised jurisdiction over the high-speed rail project). Thus, the ICCTA
does not imply any congressional intent to preempt California’s proprietary
decisions in the rail market and foreclose the availability of the market
participant doctrine.
B.

NCRA’s Obligation to Comply with CEQA When It
Pursues Proprietary State Activity Is Not Preempted.

The market participant doctrine recognizes that public entities, like
private entities, engage markets in numerous ways to pursue their unique
interests. See Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 227. As Plaintiffs have
explained, federal courts have adopted alternative tests to determine
whether a particular state action falls within the market participant doctrine.
See OB:39 (citing Cardinal Towing v. City of Bedford, Tex., 180 F.3d 686
(5th Cir. 1999), and Johnson v. Rancho Santiago Cmty. Coll. Dist., 623
F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2010)). Here, the relevant test is whether the
challenged state action reflects the state’s “interest in its efficient
procurement of needed goods and services, as measured by comparison
with the typical behavior of private parties in similar circumstances.”
Cardinal Towing, 180 F.3d at 693 (emphasis added); cf. Children's Hosp.
& Med. Ctr. v. Bonta, 97 Cal. App. 4th 740, 768 (2002) (declining to apply
the market participant doctrine where there was “no genuine private market
regarding the delivery of” healthcare at issue there).
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HSRA echoes Defendants’ argument that this test is not satisfied
because “[o]nly public agencies must comply with CEQA’s procedural and
substantive mandates.” HSRA:46-47. But that fact is irrelevant under the
market participant doctrine. Numerous courts have upheld standards for
proprietary actions that apply to public agencies but not private entities.
See White v. Mass. Council of Const. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983);
Engine Mfrs., 498 F.3d at 1045-46; Tocher, 219 F.3d at 1048-50; Big
Country Foods, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Anchorage School Dist., Anchorage,
Alaska, 952 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 1992). There is no requirement
that public and private proprietors act identically. See Rancho Santiago,
623 F.3d at 1026-28.
Moreover, “‘efficient procurement’ means procurement that serves
the state’s purposes – which may include purposes other than saving money
– just as private entities serve their purposes by taking into account factors
other than price.” Engine Mfrs., 498 F.3d at 1045-46. It is undisputed that
private entities may, as part of their proprietary actions, embrace
environmental standards in their decisionmaking processes. Id. at 1047
(citing private programs for procuring less-polluting vehicles]; see also
Servs. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 99 v. Options—A Child Care and Human
Services Agency, 200 Cal. App. 4th 869, 873, 877 (2011) (private childcare
provider agreed to Brown Act compliance). Neither the parties nor amici
have identified a provision in the ICCTA that would prevent such private
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behavior. RB:23-24. Consequently, the ICCTA does not preempt CEQA’s
application to state proprietary actions, which serves California’s purpose
of considering and, where feasible, reducing the environmental impacts of
public actions before resources are irretrievably committed to those
endeavors. Laurel Heights, 47 Cal. 3d at 392.
C.

Contrary to HSRA’s Assertion, Market Participant Cases
Protect from Preemption State Rules Governing
Proprietary Activity.

HSRA contends that this case does not involve state proprietary
conduct because “a public agency’s actions to comply with CEQA,
standing alone, are not market participation.” HSRA:44. This argument
misunderstands both CEQA and the market participant doctrine.
First, an agency’s actions and obligation to comply with CEQA do
not “stand alone.” CEQA always applies to decisions regarding
“discretionary projects proposed to be carried out or approved by public
agencies.” Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21080(a). Relevant here, discretionary
projects subject to CEQA include “actions undertaken by any public agency
including but not limited to public works construction” and publiclyfinanced activities. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15378(a)(1), (2). Thus,
CEQA operates only in conjunction with discretionary agency actions to
pursue the state’s proprietary interests, including NCRA’s discretionary
actions to lease the rail line, fund line repair and rehabilitation, and carry
out its project. See Agency:7-8 (stating same). HSRA is simply wrong to
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claim that “voluntary action by [NCRA] making choices in a specific free
market . . . [is] lacking in this case.” HSRA:44.
HSRA’s attempt to define NCRA as a separate proprietor
“regulated” by CEQA does not change this analysis. HSRA:47-49. NCRA
exists only as an agent of the State of California; it has no legally distinct
status. City of Columbus, 536 U.S. at 425 (state subdivisions “are created
as convenient agencies to exercise such of the State’s powers as it chooses
to entrust to them”). Under the market participant doctrine, it is irrelevant
that “not only the state, but also some of its political subdivisions, are
directed to take” actions. Engine Mfrs., 498 F.3d at 1045-46; Big Country
Foods, 952 F.2d at 1179 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A state should not be penalized
for exercising its power through smaller, localized units; local control
fosters both administrative efficiency and democratic governance.”).
NCRA’s spending and contractual actions in furtherance of its statutory
mission to own and operate the NWP line, including spending on major
repairs to reopen the line and on an EIR to evaluate the impacts of that
work, merely advance the state’s proprietary interests. See AR:13:6796,
16:8080, 8572; Gov’t Code § 93020 (empowering NCRA to “acquire, own,
operate, and lease … property” to pursue its mission).
Second, the market participant doctrine does not support HSRA’s
attempt to sever CEQA and its enforcement mechanisms from state
proprietary conduct. Rather, under the doctrine, courts evaluate the
53

standards that govern proprietary actions as a component of the larger state
proprietary decisionmaking process. For instance, in Engine
Manufacturers, plaintiffs argued that the Clean Air Act preempted “fleet
rules” adopted by the South Coast Air Quality Management District, which
set various environmental standards for vehicles purchased or leased by
state or local agencies. 498 F.3d at 1036-37. In establishing these rules,
the South Coast Air District did not itself procure goods in the marketplace.
Rather, the District’s rules set standards that “govern[ed] purchasing,
procuring, leasing, and contracting for the use of vehicles by state and local
governmental entities.” Id. at 1045. The Ninth Circuit held that the
environmental standards required for these proprietary actions ultimately
reflected California’s “interest in its efficient procurement of needed goods
and services,” and thus the rules were not preempted. Id. at 1048; but see
1049 (fleet rules that governed private purchases fell outside of the market
participant doctrine).
Similarly, in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction
Employers, Inc., the Supreme Court considered an as-applied challenge to
an executive order setting workforce standards for construction projects
financed by the city of Boston. 460 U.S. at 205-06, 209. The court held
that “applying . . . the executive order to projects funded wholly with city
funds” was protected under the market participant doctrine because “the
Commerce Clause establishes no barrier to conditions” that govern the
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market behavior of public entities. Id. at 209, 214-15. Other market
participant cases employ the same method of analysis. See Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 797-98, 809-10 (1976) (upholding
statutes enacted to encourage market transactions for protecting Maryland’s
environment); Tocher, 219 F.3d 1040, 1048-49 (upholding ordinance
authorizing the creation of “rules and regulations to guide [a city’s]
formation of contracts for towing services”); Big Country Foods, 952 F.2d
at 1175 (upholding Alaska statute requiring school districts to pay more to
purchase in-state milk).15
Thus, HSRA is incorrect that the focus of market-participant cases
“is whether the particular challenged action or state law is its market
participation” (HSRA:43), and that applying CEQA to the proprietary
actions of public rail entities falls outside of the doctrine. HSRA:49. Like
other market participant cases, applying CEQA to publicly-financed rail
projects properly furthers the State’s proprietary interest in ensuring that
agencies consider environmental impacts when spending public resources
on publicly-pursued projects. Engine Mfrs., 498 F.3d 1031.

15

In contrast, the market participant doctrine does not shield states’
exercise of their spending powers to regulate private conduct in a manner
that would interfere with the National Labor Relations Act. Chamber of
Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008); Wis. Dept. of Indus.,
Labor and Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 287 (1986).
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Nor does CEQA’s citizen enforcement mechanism transform state
requirements for proprietary action into preempted regulations. Engine
Manufactures rejected an almost identical argument: “we do not see how
action by a state or local government that is proprietary when enforced by
one mechanism loses its proprietary character when enforced by some other
mechanism.” Engine Mfrs., 498 F.3d at 1048 (upholding rules that
contained enforcement mechanisms).
HSRA’s attempts to distinguish this holding are unavailing. See
HSRA:50. First, CEQA’s codification in the Public Resources Code
provides no meaningful basis for distinction. Just like CEQA, the vehicle
emission rules in Engine Manufacturers were adopted separately from the
proprietary behavior they governed. Nor did the Clean Air Act’s
preemption waiver for certain California air regulations dictate the outcome
in Engine Manufacturers. See HSRA:51. The Ninth Circuit observed that
there was “no contention that California has obtained a waiver for the
[challenged] Fleet Rules.” Engine Mfrs., 498 F.3d at 1043 n.3.
For similar reasons, HSRA incorrectly suggests that the
“unprecedented” posture of this case casts doubt on employing the market
participant doctrine. HSRA:34-35. First, at least one non-California case
has allowed plaintiffs to rely on the doctrine to defeat preemption as against
public agencies. See Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Edu., 303 Conn.
402, 449-54 (2012). Moreover, Atherton properly rejected HSRA’s
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argument, observing that “there is no authority supporting the argument
that the power to ‘invoke’ the doctrine is reserved for [public agencies] to
selectively assert in order to exempt those projects of [their] choosing from
federal preemption.” 228 Cal. App. 4th at 339 (it is “unusual to say the
least” that a public agency was asserting federal preemption “instead of
defending the application of state law”). As a question of law, the
applicability of the market participant doctrine does not turn on the identity
of the party that asserts it.
Ultimately, it is the purpose, not the form, of the state action that
matters. Tocher, 219 F.3d at 1048-50. State statutes that are intended to
regulate private behavior fall outside of the market participant doctrine.16
For instance, the False Claims Act provisions in the Grupp cases regulated
the conduct of a private entity, DHL, not the conduct of public entities. See
New York ex rel. Grupp v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 19 N.Y.3d 278
(2012); New York ex rel. Grupp v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 922 N.Y.S.2d
888 (2011); DHL Express (USA), Inc. v. Florida ex rel. Grupp, 60 So.3d
426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). Similarly, the spending regulations in
Gould and Chamber of Commerce v. Brown set standards for private

16

HSRA mistakenly relies on Whitten v. Vehicle Removal Corp., 56
S.W.3d 293 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001), HSRA:43, 50, which did not consider the
market participant doctrine. Whitten found that Texas regulation of private
tow operations was not covered by the “safety regulation exception” to
preemption, which is unique to the FAAAA. 56 S.W.3d at 304-08.
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individuals and entities that received public funds and contracts,
purposefully regulating their behavior through the states’ spending power.
Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60; Gould, 475 U.S. at 287.
In contrast, enactments that are intended to govern a public entity’s
proprietary actions – like the fleet rules upheld in Engine Manufacturers,
the workforce standards applied in White, and CEQA here – are properly
protected by the market participant doctrine.
IV.

Defendants’ Voluntary Agreements to Comply with CEQA Are
Not Preempted.
HSRA does not dispute the general rule that voluntary agreements

are not subject to preemption. HSRA:51-53; see Flynn v. Burlington N.
Santa Fe Corp., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1189 (E.D. Wash. 2000) (“no
authority” under ICCTA for the proposition that a carrier is “precluded
from voluntarily complying with local permitting regulations”). Rather,
HSRA asserts that if specific facts show a voluntary agreement
unreasonably interferes with railroad operations, the presumption against
preemption may be rebutted. HSRA:53-54. HSRA offers only a
theoretical argument without facts relevant to this case.
Here, there is no question that Defendants voluntarily agreed to
comply with CEQA on numerous occasions. AR:9:4620-46 (Master
Agreement with State); AR:13:6731 (Lease Agreement between NCRA and
NWPCo); App:8:77b:2055, 2064, (2006 NWPCo Business Plan);
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AR:17:8911 (Novato Consent Decree). Defendants also voluntarily agreed
that the right to operate under the lease was subject to Sonoma-Marin Area
Rail Transit District’s consent, execution of equipment lease and tax
approvals (AR:13:6731), and NWPCo’s compliance with the State Consent
Decree (AR:13:6746).
Moreover, as HSRA concedes, the question of unreasonable
interference is a fact-based inquiry. HSRA:51. Defendants cannot possibly
demonstrate that enforcement of CEQA interferes with interstate
commerce. To the contrary, the facts here show unequivocally that CEQA
compliance is a benefit, not a burden, because it was an integral element of
the public funding to enable rail transport. OB:48-51. NCRA freely
elected to receive over $31 million in state funds with conditions, including
CEQA compliance, to start trains hauling freight in interstate commerce
again. This public financial support was also critical to the NCRA
partnership with NWPCo to reopen the line. See, e.g., AR:13:6595, 660001, 6739, 6750.
Enabling commerce is the opposite of interfering with commerce.
See Mason & Dixon Lines Inc. v. Steudle, 683 F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir. 2012)
(no dormant Commerce Clause violation when completion of state-funded
road construction contract “encourage[s] the flow of commerce”);
AR:17:8901-02 (in Novato Consent Decree, Defendants averring CEQA
review is not “unreasonable burden on interstate commerce”). A contrary
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interpretation is antithetical to the ICCTA’s very purpose, which was
enacted to allow railroads to be competitive against other modes of ground
transportation.
As discussed, the only relevant transaction before the STB was a
conveyance to NWPCo of NCRA’s right to operate; the STB lacks
jurisdiction over line rehabilitation, repair and maintenance. See Section
I.C. Since NWPCo and NCRA had agreed in the lease to condition
NWPCo’s operation rights on NCRA’s CEQA compliance, the STB could
not have approved anything different from rights given by the lease. The
STB could not approve rights NCRA did not have, including the right to
proceed without CEQA compliance to which NCRA committed in the
Master Agreement and its internal directive.17
Voluntary CEQA compliance here does not unreasonably burden
railroad operations; in fact, the facts establish that CEQA compliance
facilitates operations. As HSRA concedes, Defendants have the burden to
establish facts that a voluntary agreement constitutes an unreasonable
burden on railroad operations. Wichita Terminal Ass’n, BNSF Ry. & Union

17

The STB acknowledged that NWPCo’s right to operate was subject to
conditions outside of its jurisdiction: “NWPCo. invoked the Board’s
authority to acquire the common carrier obligations and, after repairs, to
conduct rail operations on the line.” AR:16:8540 (emphasis added). Thus,
the STB recognized that rail operations could occur after repairs, which
under state law and the voluntary commitments of NCRA required CEQA
review.
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Pac. R.R. Co.— Petition for Declaratory Order, FD No. 35765, 2015 WL
3875937, at *7 (S.T.B. June 22, 2015) (“voluntary agreements between rail
carriers and state or local entities are not enforceable under § 10501(b)
where [ ] the railroad demonstrates that enforcement of its agreement
would unreasonably interfere with the railroad’s operations”) (emphasis
added). Because Defendants have never presented facts to rebut the
presumption that the voluntary agreements benefit railroad operations,
HSRA’s reliance on Woodbridge is unavailing. Twp. of Woodbridge v.
Consol. Rail Corp., Inc., FD No. 42053, 2001 WL 283507, at *2-3 (S.T.B.
Mar. 22, 2001). There is no onerous contract enforcement or law that
unreasonably interferes with the line’s operations. The STB’s HSRA
decision is not binding authority. See Mullaney v. Woods, 97 Cal. App. 3d
710, 719 (1979); RB:11-12. Moreover, the STB’s notion that a “potential
. . . effect” of CEQA compliance through a third-party enforcement action
would be sufficient to preempt voluntary agreements, absent specific facts,
contravenes well-established case law. See Franks Inv. Co., 593 F.3d at
414-15.
CONCLUSION
The ICCTA reflects a century of congressional concern over
economic regulation of railroads – such as unfair competition between rail
carries, fair and non-discriminatory rates, and rail line expansions that
might undo the rail industry. The statute is not intended to wrest state
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decisionmaking from California’s legislature or its people. Plaintiffs
respectfully request that the Court reverse the Court of Appeal and remand
the case with directions to rule on the merits of Plaintiffs’ CEQA claims.

DATED: Aug. 26, 2015

Respectfully submitted,
SHUTE, MIHALY & WEINBERGER LLP

By:
ELLISON FOLK
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62

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Rule 8.520(c)(1) of the California Rules of Court, I
hereby certify that this brief contains 13,961 words, including footnotes,
but excluding the tables of contents and authorities, signature block, and
this certificate. I have relied on the word count of the Microsoft Word
program used to prepare this Certificate.

DEBORAH A. SIVAS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
LYNDA F. JOHNSTON declares:
I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action. My
business address is 559 Nathan Abbott Way, Stanford, California 943058610.
On August 26, 2015, I served the foregoing PLAINTIFFS’
CONSOLIDATED RESPONSE TO BRIEFS OF AMICI CURIAE IN
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS AND REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
on each person named below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in a
sealed envelope, with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States
Mail at Stanford, California, addressed to each recipient respectively as
follows:
Christopher J. Neary, Esq.
Neary and O’Brien
110 South Main Street, Suite C
Willits, California 95490-3533

Andrew B. Sabey, Esq.
Linda C. Klein, Attorney at Law
Cox, Castle & Nicholson LLP
555 California Street, 10th Floor
San Francisco, California 94104-1513

Attorneys for North Coast Railroad
Authority and Board of Directors
of North Coast Railroad
Authority

Attorneys for Northwestern Pacific
Railroad Company

Clare Lakewood, Attorney at Law
Center for Biological Diversity
1212 Broaway, Suite 800
Oakland, California 94612-1805

Kurt R. Wiese, General Counsel
Barbara Baird, Chief Deputy Counsel
South Coast Air Quality Management
District
21865 Copley Drive
Diamond Bar, California 91765-4178

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Center
for Biological Diversity

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae South Coast
Air Quality Management District
1

Jason W. Holder, Esq.
Holder Law Group
339 15th Street, Suite 202
Oakland, California 94612-3319

Brian C. Bunger, District Counsel
Bay Area Air Quality Management
District
939 Ellis Street
San Francisco, California 94101-7714

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Madera
County Farm Bureau and Merced
County Farm Bureau

Attorney for Amicus Curiae Bay Area Air
Quality Management District

Stuart M. Flashman, Esq.
5626 Ocean View Drive
Oakland, California 94618-1533

David Pettit, Esq.
Melissa Lin Perrella, Attorney at Law
Ramya Sivasubramanian, Attorney at
Law
Natural Resources Defense Council
1314 Second Street
Santa Monica, California 90401-1103

Attorney for Amici Curiae Town of
Atherton, California Rail
Foundation, Transportation
Solutions Defense and Education
Fund, Community Coalition on
High-Speed Rail, and Patricia
Hogan-Giorni
Mark N. Melnick
Myung J. Park
Carolyn Nelson Rowan
Deputy Attorneys General
Office of the Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite
11000
San Francisco, California 94102-7004
Attorneys for Amici Curiae the
California Environmental
Protection Agency, the California
Natural Resources Agency, and
certain of their Departments and
Boards

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Sierra Club,
Coalition for Clean Air, Natural
Resources Defense Council, Planning
and Conservation League, and
Communities for a Better
Environment
Danae J. Aitchison, Deputy Attorney
General
Office of the Attorney General
1300 I Street, Suite 125
P. O. Box 944255
Sacramento, California 94244-2550
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae California
High-Speed Rail Authority
Clerk of the Court
California Court of Appeal
First Appellate District, Division Five
350 McAllister Street
San Francisco, California 94102-4796

Clerk of the Court
Superior Court of California, County
of Marin
P.O. Box 4988
San Rafael, California 94913-4988

Court of Appeal

Trial Court
2

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
correct, and that this declaration was executed August 26, 2015 at Stanford,
California.

LYNDA F. JOHNSTON

3

